What Now?
and then, what?
IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi speaks to air and ground crews at the Ramon Airbase in southern Israel, October 29, 2024. (Israel Defense Forces)
Iran initially played down Israel’s October 26th retaliatory attack. The Islamic Republic’s semi-official news agency, Tasnim, said that only “limited damage” was caused.
In his public reaction, one day later, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said: “Of course, our officials should be the ones to assess and precisely apprehend what needs to be done and do whatever is in the best interests of this country and nation.”
Khamenei’s Chief of Staff, Gholamhossein Mohammadi Golpayegani, said that Iran planned to deliver “a fierce, tooth-breaking response” to Israel’s “desperate action.”
Gen. Ali Fadavi, the deputy commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps, added to the official reactions by saying: “We have never left an aggression unanswered in 40 years. We are capable of destroying all that the Zionists possess with one operation.”
Iran’s immediate question is how it might regain some measure of deterrence and how to avoid losing face among allies fighting Israel and among supporters at home.
Yet, retaliating could have devastating consequences for Iran
In a systematic degrading of the Iranian air defenses, Israel struck in April one of the Russian-made S-300 air defense systems positioned near the Natanz nuclear facility. In the October attack, Israel destroyed the remaining three S-300 batteries at Tehran’s Imam Khomeini International Airport and the Malad missile base. Other targets included air defenses protecting Iran’s energy infrastructure, including at a major petrochemical complex and port in Khuzestan, southern Iran, and at the Abadan oil refinery on the Gulf.
Considering the significant softening up of Iranian air defenses, the certainty of Israel having several follow-up options already planned should be among Iran’s top considerations. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has stated in unequivocal terms that “Israel now has greater freedom to operate in Iran than ever before.”
IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi, speaking to aircrews at the Ramon Air Base in southern Israel on October 29, said: “Should Iran again attack, Israel would “reach Iran, with capabilities that we did not even use this time, and hit extremely hard both the capabilities and the places that we spared this time. We didn’t finish this event; we are right in the middle of it.”
Iran’s retaliatory aims could, of course, take a longer road.
The Islamic Republic could attempt to strengthen its military, but the country’s financial position should be a big hurdle to overcome. Furthermore, Russia’s intervention in Ukraine casts doubt on the dependability of its long-standing weaponry supplier.
Another option would be for Iran to retaliate through one of its proxies in Yemen or Iraq; this would protect Iran from a direct Israeli retaliatory response.
This would mean doubling down on a failed strategy. As “The Economist” wrote in its October 28 edition, “Israel will probably never again be so tolerant of Iranian-backed militias on its borders, and those militias may struggle to regain their former support. Gazans are furious with Hamas for dragging them into a war, and many Lebanese feel the same about Hizbullah.”